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Abstract   This paper discusses distributional implications of different fisheries
management regimes, using the Norwegian coastal cod fishery as a case study.
We consider the trade-off between efficiency and equity (equality regarding dif-
ferent issues) in fisheries management by examining a simple model of vessels
with different harvest technologies. While it may be argued that managers do not
take explicit account of the equity concern, we suggest that the four management
regimes applied in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery do in fact reflect a regard
for distribution. Originally, in its most unregulated form, fishery management
aimed at achieving efficiency. When stricter regulations were implemented due
to declining stock size, we observed that management placed greater weight
upon equity. As the stock situation was perceived to be improving, the manage-
ment again shifted focus back to efficiency. Nonetheless we see that the concept
of equal average production seems to be the basis for the management in the
Norwegian coastal cod fishery prior to efficiency motivated reallocations.
Key words   Distribution, efficiency, equity, fisheries management.
Introduction
It is often claimed that fisheries managers pay more attention to biology than eco-
nomics when managing fish stocks. Nonetheless, once the total allowable catch is
decided, managers must often take into account several competing heterogeneous
harvest groups. Even though the choice of regulation may be purely motivated by se-
curing the fish stock, it will also affect the allocation of harvest among these differ-
ent harvest groups. The question of what is to be accepted as a just allocation has
fascinated mankind all through history, and has resulted in many diverging theories.
In his distinction between local and global justice, Elster (1992) shows how different
situations require different distributional concepts, and points out that in daily ac-
tivities we see a large range of these concepts operating side by side.
This paper attempts to pinpoint the distributional concepts underlying different
fisheries management regimes. Fisheries managers may well implement manage-
ment regimes without consciously making equity considerations. Nonetheless, all
management regimes have underlying equity implications in the shape of different
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distributional effects. The Norwegian coastal cod fishery is of interest in this per-
spective as a number of different management regimes have been implemented in
this specific allocation problem over a short period of time. The distributional impli-
cations of these different management regimes are often discussed, but the discus-
sion has mainly focused upon the “unfairness” of the various management regimes
for different groups. The fact that the basis of these management regimes may actu-
ally consist of very different distributional concepts has not been given any atten-
tion, neither by researchers nor the agents in the industry. Hence we suggest several
different distributional concepts which may underlie the management regimes ap-
plied to the Norwegian coastal cod fishery over a number of years. This work does
not attempt to say anything regarding one management regime being more just than
another; rather, we provide an analysis of the regimes based upon their apparent
concern for equity and efficiency.
Regulations in fisheries can be divided into two main areas: effort and harvest
regulations. That is, regulation of the input in the fishery, or regulation of the output
of the fishery. We will concentrate mainly on the distributional aspects of an output
regulation, namely fish quotas, since these are most relevant for Norway.1 The quota
regimes in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery can be divided into three main types:
total quotas, vessel quotas, and group quotas, as well as combinations of these. This
paper attempts to define the underlying distributional concepts found in different
quota regimes, as well as in a free fishery. We introduce precise mathematical de-
scriptions of some distributional concepts that seem relevant, and show via a simple
model that different distributional concepts are intrinsic for the different regulation
regimes. The question that naturally arises is then: why have several different distri-
butional concepts been applied to the same allocatory problem over time? Our an-
swer to this question expands upon the finding of Elster (1992), that different situa-
tions require different distributional concepts. For the Norwegian coastal cod fish-
ery, we observe a tendency to place greater weight on distributional issues when the
stock size is low; once the size of the stock is large enough, the managers shift em-
phasis towards efficiency. We also show how a specific distributional concept in-
volving equality of average production per input seems to underlie the allocation of
harvest in the Norwegian case.
Very little work has been done regarding distributional implications in fisheries
management. Bromley and Bishop commented upon this fact already in 1977 (p. 286):
Equity issues are relegated to vaguely worded caveats or are assumed away. Little
or no solid research results on the distributional implications of alternative policies
are presented. Again, this is typical of the fisheries literature generally.
Bromley and Bishop (1977) attempt to show that in general, efficiency requirements
in fisheries inherently include distributional effects. Easley and Prochaska (1987)
claim that distributional issues do matter to fisheries managers, and use casual evi-
dence from several different fisheries to support their claim. More recent work has
been done by Salvanes and Squires (1996), who examine equity-efficiency trade-offs
in the introduction of quotas, quota trade, and restrictions on trade. Dupont and
Phipps (1991) discuss monetary distributional effects of a royalty tax regulation and
a change in catch distribution versus the status quo in the British Colombia commer-
cial salmon fishery. Matthíasson (1992) discusses the efficiency and equity implica-
tions of different groups obtaining the rights to utilize and distribute former com-
mon resources in fisheries. The distribution that results from these rights is only su-
1 The model which we set up can, however, also be used to analyze some forms of effort regulation.Equity and Efficiency in Fisheries Management 205
perficially discussed. Eikeland (1993) draws attention to the distributional effects of
changing from a single species management to a multispecies management in fisher-
ies. He describes the distributional problems of sparing some species or age groups
from fishing, in order to enhance the growth of some other age group or species.
This may result in losses to some vessel types and nations, due to their dependencies
upon specific species or age groups. Eriksen and Mikalsen (1995) discuss the ties
between legitimacy and justice in regulatory regimes. Roemer (1996) and Roemer
and Silvestre (1993) present several appealing suggestions regarding how to share a
regulated commons, such as a fishery. There has, however, been no presentation (to
the authors’ knowledge) that discusses the underlying comparative distributional im-
plications of several nontransferable rights regulations applied to a single fishery, as
is attempted in this work.
To make our model as simple as possible we examine two profit maximizing
agents who have differing profit functions.2 We look at both horizontal and vertical
distributional effects. Under the former, the agents belong to the same suitably de-
fined “group,” whereas the latter permits agents to belong to different groups. For
simplicity, and as is the case in Norway, we interpret a group as being defined as
vessels of similar length. We are interested in distributional implications of alloca-
tions made between groups (vertical) and within one group (horizontal). The study
of distributional concepts is limited to utilitarian and egalitarian distributions, as
these effectively cover the Norwegian case. We define utilitarianism as the situation
where there is no room for increasing total profits within the given regime, hence
maximizing total profits. Thus we define a local unweighted form of utilitarianism.
As regards egalitarian distributions, we differentiate between equal access to the re-
source, equal harvest shares and equal average production per input.3
Despite the fact that distributional aspects may not be explicitly in the manag-
ers’ focus, we observe that the different management regimes nonetheless allow the
manager different degrees of control regarding implementation of specific distribu-
tional concepts. In the case of the Norwegian coastal cod fishery, we find a tendency
for managers to choose regimes which allow greater control over final allocations in
the years of perceived low stock sizes. There also seems to be a movement from
more utilitarian management regimes to more horizontally egalitarian management
regimes, as the stock situation worsens. Once the stock is perceived to be in better
shape, the management again moves back to a more efficiency motivated approach.
It is important to note at this stage that we are not suggesting that managers explic-
itly choose between distribution concepts when regulating a fishery. The regime
governing quota distribution is, in practice, more likely to be determined by factors
such as political pressure and influence. Our ex post evaluation of the distributional
implications of the different regimes can be used in order to support the adoption of
a particular system, or to justify a move away from it.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section outlines the quota regula-
tions that have been implemented in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery, while the
third section models the distributional implications of the different quota regimes.
Using this model as the analytical foundation, the fourth section discusses the regu-
lation of the Norwegian cod fishery. Finally we sum up the findings and mention
points which might mitigate the results.
2 Extending the analysis to more than two agents is straightforward in principle, given the model struc-
ture presented in this work. In practice, however, the more agents considered, the more information will
be required in order to evaluate the distributional consequences of the regime.
3 In fact all distributional concepts which we consider can be regarded as attempting to equalize differ-
ent elements, since the utilitarian solution is obtained when agents have equal marginal profits.Armstrong and Clark 206
Four Regimes in the Norwegian Coastal Cod Fishery
In Norwegian waters, the North-East Arctic cod fishery is today the largest single
fishery in terms of value. The Norwegian catch has varied considerably, from annual
harvests around 400,000 tonnes in the 1970s, to 88,700 tonnes in 1990. In recent
years the cod stock has shown good growth, and Norwegian harvests are now around
300,000 tonnes. A large number of vessels all along the Norwegian coast are in-
volved in the fishery. These vessels vary from highly mechanized sea going fishing
vessels, to small one-man operations close to shore.
There are clear differences between the quota regimes found in the capitalized
trawl vessel group, and the more labor intensive, but nonetheless diverse coastal ves-
sel group in the Norwegian cod fishery. The trawl vessel group has a long tradition
of quota regulations, while quotas are a relatively new occurrence for the coastal
vessels. In the following we will concentrate on the regulations implemented on
some coastal vessels as a result of special rights allotted them due to historic catch.
Regime I.  Free Fishery (FF)
Prior to the late 1960s quota regulations were quite uncommon. In the 1970s several
important fish stocks showed signs of depletion, and various regulations were imple-
mented. However, in the cod fisheries the coastal vessels were largely exempted from
any quota regulations. Up to the mid 1980s the coastal vessels that had the right to fish
cod operated in a virtually free fishery. The coastal vessels were allowed to continue
fishing even after the Norwegian allowable catch, agreed upon with the then-Soviet
Union, was harvested.4 Thus there was no real limit to the total catch allowed the
coastal vessels, and these fishers were free to harvest as much as they desired.5
After many years of Norwegian over-fishing, the perception of a declining cod
stock, and repeated complaints from the Soviet Union, the Norwegian fisheries man-
agers decided in 1989 to stop the coastal fishery before the year was over.
Regime II.  Total Quota (TQ)
In 1989 a new short-lived management regime was introduced; a total quota (TQ)
was decided and all fishers harvested freely within the quota. When the total quota
was harvested, the managers halted all fishing. In 1989 the coastal fishery was
stopped as early as the 18th of April.6
The vessels with the shortest travel distance to the resource, and the greatest
ability to harvest quickly, had the advantage here. This regime gives very uneven
supply to the market, with a large concentration of the catch delivered at the begin-
ning of the year.
Regime III.  Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQ)
The shock treatment of 1989 resulted in a loud demand for regulations in the coastal
vessel group. The Norwegian Fisher’s Association,7 the political voice of Norwegian
4 The North-East Arctic cod stock is a transboundary stock managed cooperatively by Russia and Nor-
way.
5 We call this management regime a free fishery rather than an open access fishery (even though that was
its actual nature). Increasing or decreasing numbers of fishers do not affect our results for this regime.
6 There were some exceptions, such as by-catch allowances.
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fishers, demanded regulations in the shape of individual vessel quotas (IVQ). The
Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries chose to implement this new regime which ap-
peared in 1990. The allowable catch allocated to the coastal vessel group was di-
vided between the different coastal vessels according to vessel length.8 At the most
there have been twenty-nine different length groups where almost all the groups
consist of vessels between n and n + 1 meters, n varying for each group. Within each
vessel length group one would find equal quota shares. Hence three vessels of
lengths 9.9, 10.5, and 11.0 meters would all obtain different individual quotas, as
they belong to three different length groups. The shares are called quota factors
where the smallest length group has a quota factor of 1, and all the other length
groups have different multiples of this. At the beginning of the year a quota factor of
1 would be set to imply a specific number of tonnes for harvest. Hence the summa-
tion of the product of quota factor tonnage and the number of vessels in each group,
gives the total allocated harvest. If, however, it seemed clear that some vessel groups
would not harvest their full allocation, the managers just increased the number of
tonnes in the quota factor. This would allow all vessel groups an equal relative in-
crease in their allocations, and secure that the total allowable harvest was taken.
One of the assets of the vessel quota system was that it allowed the vessel own-
ers to plan their cod fishing seasons to fit in with other alternative fisheries. None-
theless, the vessel quota system created losers—mainly cod-dependent fishers, and
owners of vessels with high capital costs. Due to geographical differences, some
vessels are more dependent upon cod than others. These vessels have fewer alterna-
tive fish species upon which they can harvest. Some have higher capital costs (new
or modernized vessels) and cannot subsist on the limited quota. The demand for a
less stringently controlled, more flexible management when the stock was increas-
ing, resulted in yet another management regime.
Regime IV.  Individual Vessel Quotas and Group Quotas (IVQ + GQ)
The vessel quotas were in part kept in the new regime of 1994, though at a lower
level than for the previous year. The new aspect was the group quota (GQ). This
quota system (sometimes called the competition quota) operates as a total quota
within which all vessels in a specified group may fish. After a vessel has fished its
IVQ, it can continue fishing until either the total harvest in the group quota is taken,
or the vessel reaches the maximum level that the individual vessels are allowed to
harvest (the individual maximum quota) within the group quota.9 This individual
maximum level is also decided by vessel length. The motive for this divided regime
is, amongst other things, to accommodate the vessels that require a greater harvest
for economic survival.
In principle there is no transferability of quotas in the Norwegian coastal cod
fishery, though in practice harvest rights have followed the vessels.10 There have also
8 Historical catch presumably played a role in the relative shares.
9 Degrees of so called over-regulation can make a group quota function either like an IVQ or a TQ.
Over-regulation is the measure of the percentage of catch that is overbooked in the quota regime. That
is, an over-regulation of 25% indicates that the resource stock budget (or allowable catch) is actually
25% below the total possible catch, if all catch their individual maximum quota. Thus if there is a high
over-regulation, the individual maximum quotas are high enough to ensure conditions close to a TQ re-
gime. If the over-regulation is low, the individual maximum quotas are so low that in essence the situa-
tion may function like an IVQ regime. The group quota of 1994 was divided into two time periods, in
order to ensure a year-round supply to the market.
10 Flaaten, Heen, and Salvanes (1995) show how rent in a limited entry quota managed fishery is capital-
ized in the value of the fishing license. This is illustrated using Norwegian purse seiners where licenses
follow the vessels, in a similar way that rights follow the vessel in the coastal cod fishery.Armstrong and Clark 208
been severe geographical restrictions regarding the sale of vessels, in order to at-
tempt to secure harvest rights remaining in specific parts of the country.
Modeling the Distributional Implications
We begin by defining the distributional concepts that we consider relevant, and then
investigate how they suit the different management regimes. Our choice of distribu-
tional concepts is limited to egalitarianism and utilitarianism. Egalitarianism is usu-
ally defined by some form of equalization of agents. Yet Sen (1992) relates how
most justice theories are defined by some form of equalization—utilitarianism re-
quires equal weighting of all agents, pure libertarians demand equal liberties, and
Rawls (1979) insists on agents having equal rights to some basic goods. Hence it
may be right to say that egalitarianism is central in all notions of justice. Nonethe-
less, actual allocations may differ depending on what justice concept is implemented
in the allocatory situation.
Utilitarianism, often connected to Bentham and Mill, requires the maximization
of the total of some entity (utility being the classical maximand). What is to be
maximized depends on how justice should be meted out to the individual or society.
Some work has been done regarding the theoretical discussion of whether justice
should be meted out in the shape of resources or utility (Dworkin 1981a,b; Roemer
1986). Dworkin (1981a,b) argues within the egalitarian idea of justice that the
equalization of resources is the only ethically supportable way to exercise justice.
Roemer (1986) shows that within a specific allocation mechanism in a large range of
economies, equalization of resources also equalizes welfare. In this work we study
several different metrics, namely profit, harvest, average production, and access. The
former metric is discussed as regards utilitarianism, while the latter three are related
to egalitarianism.11 Hence we concentrate on aspects of equity versus efficiency (at
the industry level), which seems appropriate for the questions surrounding fisheries
management.
DEFINITION 1. A utilitarian (U) management regime is defined as a management
regime which distributes resources in such a way that it ensures that maximum total
profit (which here determines utility) cannot be increased. Hence no reallocation of
harvests may increase the total profits within the management regime.
We consider three dimensions of egalitarianism.
DEFINITION 2. An equal access (EA) management regime is defined as a manage-
ment regime that allows all vessels equal access to the resource being harvested.
DEFINITION 3. An equal resource (ER) management regime is defined as a manage-
ment regime that ensures that the vessels involved obtain the same harvest amounts.
DEFINITION 4. An equal average product (EAP) management regime is defined as
a management regime that ensures that the vessels involved obtain an equal average
harvest relative to the relevant input.12
11 It is clear that it is possible to discuss egalitarianism as regards profits, or utilitarianism using har-
vests, average production, or access. We have chosen to study average production related to the input of
labor. Studying the input of capital could be an alternative choice. Our choices are mainly guided by the
availability of data for the Norwegian case.
12 We would like to thank Ola Flaaten for suggesting this distributional concept.Equity and Efficiency in Fisheries Management 209
The model we study is capable of capturing both horizontal and vertical distri-
butional concepts. The horizontal distributional issue relates to distributions within a
vessel group (defined here as a length group, which is common in Norwegian
coastal fisheries). Thus within groups we find vessels of more or less similar cir-
cumstances. The vertical distributional issue will concentrate on distributions be-
tween different vessel groups (different length groups). We study these two distribu-
tional issues separately.
For simplicity we focus upon the case of two vessels indexed by i = 1, 2. These
vessels can be regarded as belonging to one group or different groups. Hence the
vessels represent either two different vessel types within one group, or vessels in
each their respective groups. The profit π i of vessel i, is given by:
π ii ii ii xf x c x () () () =− ,   i = 1, 2 (1)
where xi ≥  0 is the number of man hours spent fishing (but could well be defined as
any alternative input), fi(xi) is the harvest as a function of man hours, and ci(xi) are
the costs as a function of man hours, all for vessel i. We have assumed that the price
of the harvest is unity.
In the following we will make some simplifying assumptions regarding equation (1):
ci(xi) = cxi;   i = 1, 2 (1.1)
where c is constant. Thus each vessel has the same cost, with constant marginal cost.
This may be seen as both vessels having the same wage per man hour, which would
be the case in a competitive labor market for fishers. The assumption in equation
(1.1) is not strictly necessary, but is included for clarity of exposition.13 It is further-
more assumed that harvests are continuous, strictly concave functions of man hours.
fi(xi) is at least twice continuously differentiable, with  ′ fi  > 0 and  ′′ fi  < 0. Addition-
ally fi(0) = 0, and i = 1, 2.
In order to determine harvests which satisfy our concept of utilitarianism, the
assumption in equation (1.1) enables us to simply concentrate upon the harvest func-
tions fi(xi). For a given x2 > 0, we have a utilitarian (U) management regime if the
man hours of vessel 1, ˆ x1(x2) > 0, satisfies
′ = ′ fxx fx 112 22 [ˆ () ] ()    for  ˆ , xx 12 00 >>    (2)
Equation (2) expresses the egalitarian element of the U regime since it reflects
equalization of marginal profit (which is here equivalent to equalizing the marginal
products of the vessels). As long as equation (2) holds, giving strictly positive effort
combination [ˆ x1(x2), x2], there is no reallocation of man hours xi between the two
vessel types, such that total profits can be increased. Since harvest is a function of
man hours, equation (2) implies that no reallocation of harvests will increase total















13 Hence differences between vessels are expressed by the harvest function alone. An alternative ap-
proach would be to specify profit directly as π i = hi – ki(hi) where ki(hi) is the cost of taking harvest hi. In
this case differences between vessels are expressed solely by the cost function. Our approach allows the
metric used for comparison to depend explicitly on the input to the fishery.Armstrong and Clark 210
Hence a U allocation is upwards sloping in input (x1, x2) space; however, the exact
shape of the locus ˆ x1(x2) cannot be determined since the derivative dxd x 2
12
2 ˆ /  cannot
be signed in general. For strictly positive x1 and x2, the fact that the ˆ x1(x2) locus is
strictly upwards sloping implies that for x2, there is a unique value of x1 which yields
the utilitarian allocation, i.e.  ˆ x1(x2) is a single valued function. Equation (2) is valid
for strictly positive x1 and x2. In accordance with the definition of the U regime
(definition 1), we must consider the possibility of a corner solution in which one
vessel has zero input. In this case, no reallocation can improve joint profit if
′ ≥ ′ ≥= = ≠ fx fx x x ij i j ii jj i j () () , , , , . for 0 0 1 2
An equal resources (ER) management regime requires that for a given x2,  x1(x2)
must satisfy
fxx fx 112 2 2 [() ] () =  for  x1 ≥  0, x2  ≥  0 (4)
















Thus the  x1(x2) locus is a single-valued function; again, however, the exact shape of
this locus is impossible to determine at this level of generality.
An equal average product (EAP) management regime requires that for a given
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giving effort allocation [ ˜ x1(x2), x2]. We see that as long as equation (1.1) is the case,
equal production per unit input must be the same as equal profit per unit input. The


















































For  ˜ x1(x2) > 0 we have that d ˜ x1/dx2 > 0 since both numerator and denominator are
negative in this expression.14 Hence the  ˜ x1(x2) locus is a single-valued function;
once more, however, the exact shape of this locus is impossible to determine at this
level of generality.
In order to obtain both an ER and a U allocation simultaneously, we must have
some value of x2 such that  xx xx 12 12 () ˆ () = .
14 The expression  ′ fi (xi) – [fi(xi)/xi] is the marginal product minus the average product. For strictly con-
cave, positive valued functions, the latter is larger.Equity and Efficiency in Fisheries Management 211
A sufficient condition to ensure that the U and ER allocations do not coexist is:
′ > ′ ≥=≠ fx fx x ij i j ij () () , , , ,, 01 2 (5)
which simply states that vessel i is always more productive than j at the margin.
Integrating the condition in equation (5) implies that fi(x) > fj(x)  ∀ x > 0, thus
for the ER locus we must have xj > xi, while the U locus requires xi > xj [by equation
(5) and the concavity of the harvest functions]. Hence ER and U cannot coexist in
this case. Likewise for ER and EAP, since coexistence of ER and EAP requires that
x1 = x2, which is not possible for ER when equation (5) is the case. Equation (5)
does however not disallow the coexistence of EAP and U, but this would require an
(x1, x2) combination such that the vessels have equal marginal products and equal av-
erage products.
In figure 1 we have assumed no coexistence of any of the three distributional
concepts where both vessels have positive input; hence the loci for U, ER, and EAP
do not intersect, unless possibly when one or both vessels are inactive. The U locus
is defined in the first quadrant along the horizontal axis from the origin to the point
W, and then along the locus marked U. The EAP locus begins at the point Y on the
horizontal axis.15 We define  xi
* to be the man hours of vessel i that ensure maximum
unilateral profits, i.e., maximizing equation (1) for i = 1, 2.16 No vessel will exert
more than  xi
* of effort, which corresponds to point FF in the first quadrant of the
figure. The U locus in the first quadrant represents combinations of (x1, x2) which
satisfy equation (2), i.e., along U no reallocation of man hours will increase the total
joint profits of the two vessels. Reflecting these points in the appropriate harvest
functions yields the locus U in harvest space [h1 = f1(x1), h2 = f2(x2)] (in the third
quadrant of the figure).17 If the harvest allocations lie on U in the third quadrant, no
reallocation of the harvest can improve joint profits. The point FF in the third quad-
rant corresponds to FF in the first quadrant, and represents the free fishery.
The ER locus in effort space (first quadrant) in figure 1 describes the effort
combinations which give equal harvests, while the 45o line in harvest space (third
quadrant) is naturally the ER locus there.
The EAP locus in effort space (first quadrant) in figure 1 describes the effort
combinations which give equal average harvests, while the EAP locus in harvest
space (third quadrant) describes the harvests that ensure the same. We observe that
the U and EAP loci always intersect the same axis.18
An alternative to the situation in figure 1 is that the different loci do intersect.
One can imagine a situation where a small vessel can start harvesting efficiently at a
much lower number of man hours than the larger vessel can. Hence the smaller ves-
sel may have the higher marginal productivity at low number of man hours, while at
some point the larger vessel’s marginal productivity will bypass that of the smaller
one. The situation which arises is illustrated in figure 2 where vessel 1 has the
higher marginal productivity for low harvest levels, while vessel 2’s marginal pro-
ductivity exceeds that of vessel 1 for higher harvest levels, resulting in the U and the
ER loci intersecting. Hence vessel 2’s free fishery harvest is greater than that of ves-
15 In figure 1 we assume that  ′ f1 (0) ≠   ′ f2 (0). If  ′ f1 (0) =  ′ f2 (0), then U and EAP both start at the origin.
16 At a maximum we have  ′ fx ii () *  = c. In the figure we have not drawn the marginal cost curve which
determines  xi
*. This is done to avoid cluttering the figure.
17 It can easily be shown that the slopes of the U and EAP loci are always positive in harvest space.
18 To see this, consider the following argument. Suppose  ′ fi (0) >  ′ fj (0). Then in order to satisfy
equation (2) and lie on the U locus, we require xi > 0 for xj = 0; thus the U locus intersects the xi
axis. Since  lim[ ( ) ] ( )
x fx x f
→ → ′
0 0  by L’Hopital’s rule, the same argument establishes that the EAP
locus intersects the xi axis.Armstrong and Clark 212
sel 1. Several intersections between the U and ER loci may well be feasible for some
vessel types. The ER and EAP loci intersect only if (and where) the harvest func-
tions of the vessels intersect.
In order to analyze the different management regimes described for the Norwe-
gian coastal cod fishery from a distributional viewpoint, we will now concentrate on
harvest space.
Distributional Implications of a Free Fishery (FF) Regime
In a FF regime the agents are free to harvest whatever amount they wish,19 re-
stricted only by the availability of the fish resource, which we may assume is
abundant as long as a regime such as this is allowed. Since the vessels have dif-
fering harvest functions, but the same marginal costs, optimal harvests will also
differ. Thus both vessels will harvest until marginal costs are just covered by
marginal revenues. We see from figure 1 that a FF regime ensures utilitarianism
(U) as the FF point is on the U locus. The FF regime also ensures equal access
Figure 1.  Distributional Concepts in Four-Quadrant Space
19 In the FF and TQ regimes of the Norwegian coastal cod fishery, there were some restrictions equiva-
lent to the group quota in regime IV, but they were not practiced.Equity and Efficiency in Fisheries Management 213
(EA), as both vessels face the same limitations (none). The analysis for the FF
regime is the same both within and between vessel groups. This is due to the
fact that in both situations we have equal access.
Distributional Implications of the Total Quota (TQ) Regime
The TQ regime ensures the two vessels equal access (EA) to the resource. To
achieve the FF allocation requires a “total quota” at least as large as  H  in figure 2
For any total quota less than this, we have some binding form of regulation. Take for
example a TQ of H–; the whole quota will be fished in this case [since the maximum that
either vessel can harvest is less than what it would harvest in a free fishery (h1
*, h2
*)], and
the final distribution of harvests will be along the line H–H–. Exactly where this final al-
location will be situated will depend upon the specific technologies operated by the two
vessels. This includes for instance the speed at which each vessel harvests. The more
efficient boat will be expected to have the greater harvest, and hence one would not
expect an ER allocation. Only for a harvest combination exactly at G (with a TQ of
H–) will the TQ regime result in a U allocation. Likewise, only for a harvest combi-
nation exactly at B will a TQ of H– result in an EAP allocation. From figure 2 we
see that the TQ must at least be as large as W in order for the possibility to exist that
the final allocation is U, given that both vessels participate in the fishery.
Figure 2.  Distributional Concepts in Harvest Space,
Free Fishery, and Total Quota RegimeArmstrong and Clark 214
Figure 2 also illustrates that certain distributional concepts cannot be imple-
mented depending on the size of the total quota. For example, once the total quota
reaches H+, the final allocation will be between Q and P (since vessel i will by defi-
nition not harvest more than hi
*). A larger total quota than this will result in an allo-
cation within the triangle FFPQ, which is incompatible with each vessel harvesting
an equal share of the resource. Similarly, once the total quota surpasses the level
corresponding to point V in figure 2, no EAP allocation will be achieved.
Note that the above points are valid whether we study within or between groups,
due to the fact that all vessels have equal access to the resource.
Distributional Implications of the Individual Vessel Quota (IVQ) Regime
In the IVQ regime we must differentiate between horizontal and vertical distribution
concepts.
Within each vessel group, each boat obtains an identical IVQ, ensuring EA and
ER to all group members. If all boats within the group are identical, then the within
group allocation is U in the sense that no redistribution of the within group quota
can increase the profit of the group as a whole. We also have EAP, since all vessels
have the same average productivity.
Consider now the allocation of an IVQ between different vessel groups; thus
vessel 1 belongs to a different group than does vessel 2. As long as the manager dif-
ferentiates between the two groups, the regime will not be EA. In contrast to the TQ
system, the IVQ regime allows sufficient control such that a U or EAP allocation be-
tween groups can be enforced if so desired. This assumes, however, that the manager
has access to sufficient information to allow the implementation of the exact point
on the U or EAP locus for the total allowable harvest level. Since implementation of
U, if desirable, requires extensive information on marginal productivity, it seems
reasonable to suggest that attainment of this allocation will be difficult in practice.20
The attempted enforcement of EAP appears to be simpler as it rests upon a compari-
son of average magnitudes (we show in the next section that the EAP concept seems
to have been applied, consciously or not, in the Norwegian management).
As noted previously, however, rigid adherence to a single distributional concept
will not always achieve its aim. Since vessel 1 will not harvest more than h1
*, the
enforcement of an EAP allocation will not be possible if the total harvest is greater
than that consistent with point V in figure 2. This demonstrates one facet of the
trade-off between equity and efficiency. Once point V is reached, it is fruitless to al-
locate additional harvests along the EAP locus since vessel 1 does not desire to fish
more. From an efficiency aspect then, additional catch beyond V should go to vessel
2 (giving a final allocation between V and FF depending on the total harvest size).
Distributional Implications of the Individual Vessel Quota and Group Quota
(IVQ + GQ) Regime
Again we must differentiate between horizontal and vertical distribution concepts.
Regarding horizontal distribution, heterogeneous vessels within a group obtain the
20 In addition, it is clear that stock effects, which we have not included in this analysis, may change pro-
duction and cost functions over time. Hence the U locus could vary for different years, depending on
stock size. Within groups, stock changes would however not be expected to have much effect, as would also
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same IVQ. Thus at the offset we find ourselves on the ER locus in figure 2. The
group quota allows the vessels to obtain different harvests, and depending on factors
such as harvest speed, this will result in a non-ER allocation. The main difference
between the IVQ + GQ regime and a TQ or GQ regime is the fact that the combina-
tion of IVQ and GQ regimes allows the manager to narrow in the allocation possi-
bilities. An example of this is shown in figure 3. By giving the two vessels indi-
vidual vessel quotas (IVQ1, IVQ2), and limiting the total harvest to  ˆ H, the feasible
allocations are found between the points S and T on the line  ˆ H ˆ H. Thus compared to a
situation of a TQ equal to  ˆ H, we see that an IVQ + GQ equal to  ˆ H limits the feasible
allocations. In the TQ case the feasible set would be limited by (h1
*, h2
*), i.e., between S´
and T´ on the line  ˆ H ˆ H. Hence we observe that the IVQ + GQ regime limits the fea-
sible set of allocation combinations via the managers choice of (IVQ1, IVQ2). In the
case shown in figure 3 the U solution is eliminated, while the EAP solution is not.
This need not necessarily always be the case, i.e., we see that lower IVQs would re-
sult in the U allocation being included in the feasible set of allocations.
When studying distribution between groups for an IVQ + GQ regime, we will
not usually have the IVQs along the ER locus. The regime does however function in
the same way as within groups, again allowing a limitation of the feasible allocation
possibilities.
Note that the closer the IVQ combination is to the total quota line, the greater is
the control exercised by the manager. That is, the smaller is the feasible area for har-
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vest combinations (i.e., between points S and T in figure 3). If IVQi = 0 ∀ i, the re-
sult is a TQ regime with no control of the final harvest combination.
The order in which the four regimes have been implemented in the Norwegian
coastal cod fishery may be said to illustrate a tendency of moving from utilitarian
management to more egalitarian regimes and back. The actual management of the
Norwegian coastal cod fishery is discussed in the next section. The FF regime is
concerned with efficiency and ensures a utilitarian result, while the IVQ regime can
be used to attempt to implement an alternative desired distribution. The IVQ + GQ
regime seems to incorporate both efficiency and distributional concern.
The Norwegian Coastal Cod Fishery in Light of the Theory
In the following we will study average vessels in two vessel groups found in the
Norwegian coastal cod fishery. Group 1 consists of vessels 8 to 12.9 meters, while
group 2 consists of vessels 13 to 20.9 meters.21 We will compare allocated harvests
with actual harvests and equal average production.
The FF regime in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery was in many ways a utili-
tarian regime, in the sense that it allowed the agents to choose the approach to the
fishery that suited them best. Reallocation would not have increased the total utility
of the agents involved. Nonetheless we cannot compare actual average harvests from
the years prior to regulations with the regulated years, as the unregulated data in-
cludes vessels of very low productivity that were not allowed into the IVQ system.
Hence we will assume that the harvests found in 1994, when group quotas were in-
troduced, are close to the FF allocation.
In figure 4, the EAP, allocated, and actual harvests for average vessels in the
two vessel groups for the years 1989–94 are presented. EAP is determined by equal-
izing harvest divided by the labor input man/year for the respective years, for the
two vessel groups (Anon 1989a,b, 1990a,b, 1991a,b, 1992a,b, 1993a,b, 1994a,b). We
choose to use labor input data for vessels from Nordland county as this is the county
with the greatest number of coastal vessels. Group 1 consists of vessels 8 to 12.9
meters involved in cod fisheries, while group 2 consists of vessels 13 to 20.9 meters
fishing with gillnet, hand-line, and Danish seine (the major harvest is cod).22 The al-
location of average harvests is found by taking allocated total harvest to the group at
the beginning of the year, and dividing by the number of vessels within the group,
using data from the Directorate of Fisheries. Actual average harvest is found simi-
larly, using data for actual harvest at the end of the year.
The parallel diagonal lines in figure 4 show the total quota allocated to the two
vessel groups in the years 1990–94. Due to the apprehension regarding the cod
stock, a total quota for all was imposed upon the coastal vessels in 1989. The TQ
regime can be seen as the resource managers’ reaction to this apprehension. This re-
gime was extremely severe for the vessels that had a limited opportunity to enter the
fishery before it was halted. This was mainly the case for small coastal vessels, for
which severe weather conditions prevented harvesting prior to the TQ being fished.
Even though in theory the vessels had equal access, actual access was not equal. We
21 These two vessel groups consist of several subgroups. The choice of aggregation is made to fit the
input data.
22 Group 1 consist of the subgroups 4 through 7, and group 2 consists of subgroups 8 through 15 of the
29 subgroups in the coastal cod fishery. It is important to note that there are smaller vessels than those
found in group 1. Hence reallocations within the coastal vessel group may increase the harvest of both
groups 1 and 2. In 1990 the number of vessels in group 1 was 2,028, while group 2 consisted of 583
vessels (for the whole country). By 1994 both groups had increased in number.Equity and Efficiency in Fisheries Management 217
see from figure 4 that for 1989 actual average harvest is far from any of the EAP
values for the following years. Vessel group 1 has the lowest actual average harvest
of all years. The fact that this management regime shows no apparent distributional
concern may explain this regime’s short life.
As regards the IVQ regime within a vessel group, EA has definitely been the
case in the Norwegian fishery for the disaggregated vessel groups. In theory ER has
also existed, but in actual fact we see a large number of vessels not harvesting their
entire IVQ. Thus the vessel groups are so heterogeneous that the IVQs have been set
such that one vessel type obtains its maximum profit within the IVQ limits. If the
difference between the IVQ and the actual harvest is not redistributed, there is a
clear inefficiency. Towards the end of the year the managers are able to observe this
fact, and have most years redistributed the IVQ such that agents that still wish to
harvest are allowed to harvest upon the unfished IVQs of their colleagues. This late
harvest may however not be as efficient as when the agents are allowed to allocate
their harvest freely, explaining some of the frustrations with the regime.
As we see in figure 4 the average allocation to group 1 in 1990 equals the
amount which this group harvested in 1989, while the larger vessel group is allo-
cated less than previously harvested. This was a part of the policy used regarding al-
locations based on historic catch. The small vessel groups were allocated a larger
share of their historic catch than the large vessel groups. There may be several rea-
sons for this. One reason is the fact that smaller vessels did not have a chance to
harvest much in 1989 due to the early halt in fishing. Availability in the years prior
to 1989 was very poor for the smallest vessels. Another reason may be the fact that
Figure 4.  Average Allocations, Average Actual Harvests,
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more small vessels were excluded from the IVQ regime than large vessels. These ex-
cluded vessels, nonetheless, dragged the average historic harvest down, making it
imperative that remaining active small vessels obtain a greater share.
There is also an interesting development in the IVQ system over the years it was
applied, as regards the quota factors. In 1990 many of the disaggregated vessel
groups have the same quota factor. For instance, all vessels between 18 and 27.9
meters have the same quota factor in 1990. In 1991 each meter length group has a
different quota factor. Hence there are ten different quota factors for the vessels be-
tween 18 and 27.9 meters. This is one example of the departure from egalitarianism,
and can be regarded as a method to improve the overall efficiency of the regime.
In figure 4 we see that allocations have a surprisingly close correspondence to EAP.
In 1994 we see that the IVQ part of the regime is set almost exactly at EAP. It seems
clear that the idea of equal average production is an important foundation for alloca-
tions, even though no one explicitly espoused this policy. Nonetheless we see that the
actual average harvest exceeds the allocated average harvest for all years. This is pre-
sumably due to reallocations (recollect that there are smaller vessels than those found in
group 1, hence also this group’s average harvest may increase when reallocations occur).
The IVQ + GQ regime was an attempt to address the problem in the IVQ regime
of the agents in the fishery who had the greatest economic requirements. The IVQ
regime, it was claimed, disallowed these agents a large enough harvest to cover
costs. Other agents in the fishery did not need to harvest their entire IVQ in order to
manage economically. It was also claimed that the agents with the greater “needs”
were the more efficient agents in the fishery. Thus we may see the move to the IVQ
+ GQ regime as an attempt to incorporate concern for efficiency in the distributional
aspect of the allocation problem. This is valid both within and between vessel
groups. This regime therefore solves the problems of the two forerunners. That is, it
solves the problem of the TQ regime where the heterogeneity of the vessels resulted
in unequal access, and the IVQ regime where the IVQ was set such that the total al-
lowable catch was not harvested. It is however clear that the IVQ + GQ regime is
only arbitrarily utilitarian. The choice of IVQs in the IVQ + GQ regime limits the
feasible set of possible harvest combinations. Hence large IVQs leave less room for
individual maneuvering, but greater opportunity for the manager to control distribu-
tion. In figure 4 we see that the managers chose smaller IVQs in 1994 than in 1993.
While the managers have abandoned the idea of determining the final allocation,
they still limit the scope for this allocation as discussed earlier. As the stock be-
comes larger, efficiency issues again become important and the GQ part of the re-
gime allows those who so desire to fish more than is dictated by the distributional
concern (reflected in the IVQ). We see that the actual average harvest in 1994 is
greater than any other year, with the difference between the actual and the allocated
average harvests being due to the group quota and reallocations.
Overall we see that both allocated and actual average harvests are far from the
ER regime. Equality for unequals does not seem to be the case (except for disaggre-
gated vessel groups in 1990, as described above regarding quota factors). The close-
ness of allocated average harvests to the EAP regime is clear. The fact that actual
average harvest always deviates from EAP may indicate a move towards more effi-
cient harvest allocations. We also see in figure 4 how the small vessel group 1 seems
to be close to its maximum harvest, since the horizontal distances between the allo-
cation and the actual harvest is small. The large vessel group 2 seems to have a
much greater potential, perhaps not even fulfilled in 1994.
The managers’ concerns for efficiency were expressed in 1995 when a new re-
gime consisting of a group quota divided into two seasons was introduced. This time
division may be thought of as expressing some distributive concern which was not
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sels will be excluded from the fishery as a result of such factors as weather condi-
tions. Compared to the TQ regime it gives the fishers greater flexibility in fitting the
cod fishing season around the harvesting of other species. Additionally, this division
of the GQ into two seasons may ensure a more even supply of cod to the market.
The concern with the distributional aspect of the allocation problem, expressed by
the willingness to set an IVQ, seems to receive lower priority after 1995, presum-
ably because of the size of the stock.
Conclusions
Output regulations in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery have been deemed neces-
sary since 1989 due to the low stock size. In this paper, we have looked at the distri-
butional implications of the implemented regimes by focusing on a simple allocation
model involving two vessels. The management regimes can be seen to incorporate
different degrees of concern for efficiency (defined here to be industry profit maxi-
mization) and equity (embodied in the equalization of various metrics). Under the
free fishery, stocks were sufficiently large such that no explicit account needed to be
taken of distributional aspects since coastal vessels were not resource constrained. But at
times this translated into the misguided belief in “market forces,” which seems to distin-
guish the first attempt at management of this stock in the total quota regime. This epi-
sode demonstrates a lack of concern with distribution, believing that fishers will achieve
an acceptable allocation unaided. When this did not occur, management of the coastal
cod fishery explicitly incorporated distributional concerns via the setting of individual
quotas for each vessel. Naturally, managers were also interested in achieving effi-
ciency within this regime, but the introduction of the IVQ system is an explicit ac-
knowledgment of the importance of equity. The concern with efficiency within this
regime is reflected in the fact that changes were made in the composition of the dif-
ferent vessel groups and their harvest shares during the lifetime of the IVQ system.
Once the resource was perceived to be in good shape, a group quota was ap-
pended to the IVQ regime. The significant fact here is that the industry was not left
to reach its own allocation even when the stock was quite large; neither were the
managers willing to enforce an allocation on the industry. By first setting an IVQ,
the managers could influence without actually enforcing the final allocation, reflect-
ing a concern for both efficiency and equity.
In the context of the model, we demonstrate that strict adherence to a single dis-
tribution concept will not be satisfactory for all levels of the resource. This is espe-
cially true when the total resource to be divided is so large that some of the vessels
reach their profit maximum before the “equitable distribution” is reached. Hence,
Elster’s (1992) arguments regarding local justice must be extended. Not only are dif-
ferent distributional concepts applicable to different situations, but also to the same
situation described by differing circumstances.
As regards the empirical relevance of the distributional concepts which we have
discussed, the data from the coastal fishery in Norway seems to suggest that the av-
erage product of the vessels was a key magnitude. The IVQ allocations closely fol-
low those which would occur if the aim were to equalize the average product (re-
lated to labor input) between groups. That the actual harvests are not identical with
the IVQ allocations reflects the fact that reallocations have been made in order to
improve the efficiency of the industry. We are not suggesting that equalization of the
average product among vessel groups necessarily was an explicit aim of the manag-
ers. However, the legitimization of a management regime may require closeness to
some recognized distributional concept. In practice EAP seems to have been the
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shares were based on historic catch. Nonetheless, full employment has been a cen-
tral goal in Norwegian politics, and the importance of labor input can be due to the
idea of justice according to effort.
The above conclusions are based on the presumption that the changes in distri-
butions that appear as a result of the changing management regimes, do not show a
trend in the way we perceive justice. That is, we do not assume that there is an over-
all movement from equality to efficiency in our society. This may however well be
the case, making the trail towards efficiency a one way road. A new crisis in the
fisheries would in this mind set not result in more equality based regimes. The only
test for this hypothesis would therefore be a new crisis in the fisheries. And however
beneficial a crisis would be for furthering this study, the overall justice of the out-
come would probably be questionable.
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